May 23, 2026

Author: Muhammad Izhar Alam Moment of Truth for the ‘Playground of Empires’ The test was simple: One should be able to sit in a pub and cheer for the English cricket team. It was proposed by member of a British Parliament Norman Tebbit decades ago, at a time when the question about how to find appropriate linkage between the loyalty of incoming migrants, to their commensurate grant of citizenship rights, was burning issue of political debate in the UK. Having served on Thatcher’s cabinet as Chancellor and Chairman of the Conservative Party as well as Secretary for Employment, and Trade & Industry, Tebbit’s proposed test continues to be a simple litmus to determine whether the incoming migrants and their children want to integrate and contribute to the nation which hosts them; or challenge it The flow of migrants from Afghanistan eastwards started to increase in 1970s. In the last five decades Pakistan has so far hosted around 4-5 Million Afghans, who fled either communist onslaught, conflict or chaos. The host country generously provided them shelter and safety in rural and urban areas, besides giving them unrestricted access to public healthcare, education, subsidized food and economic opportunities – the like of which is not seen in near or far past anywhere in the world. How critically the prized asset ‘economic access to markets’ drives national growth; a glimpse is seen in US threats of tariffs for greater access to lucrative markets of India, and consequential Indian struggle to endure economic coercion. Pakistan, contrarily had a culture of issuing beneficent ‘royal-like decrees’ for its Afghan brethren for decades. The host country provided Afghanistan with access and free passage of goods and services – imposing a direct cost of around $4-5 Bn per annum in addition to making local industries suffer a comparative and competitive disadvantage. Adding to the agony was the fact that Pakistan also continued to subsume the migrants who brazenly used informal economic networks to their own advantage, shifting the burden to Pakistani Rupee. The undocumented Afghans still circumvent all official protocols and continue to do business in construction, transport, logistics, food, retail and wholesale trade at the cost of donor nation. Despite the unprecedented favours as well as tribal, familial, linguistic and religious linkages; the Afghans were visibly kicking the boat that landed them, nurturing grudges and displaying ingratitude. Public brawls with Pakistanis fans and cheering against them remained a common spectacle during cricket matches – a litmus indicator. Post US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, there was a sharp surge in terrorist attacks emanating from Afghan soil. The prodromal symptoms were missed and Pakistan continued to remind Afghans of their fundamental commitment in Doha agreement: prevent any terror group to operate from their land. Anticipation was that Afghan setup would be able   to take concrete actions against the Taliban and Indian proxies operating from their land, in return for countless favours granted by Pakistan for decades. It only resulted in terrorism from Afghan soil reaching fever pitch and Taliban leadership issuing fatwas, legitimizing terrorist attacks against Pakistan – contributing to rising number of Afghans aiding, abetting and executing terror attacks inside Pakistan. Just as an elder brother looking at the bigger scheme of things, Pakistan still ignored the bite on its feeding hand, leniently considered various cross border attacks as mere ‘tactical irritants’ and rather chose to postpone using its economic, social and military leverages over its landlocked Muslim neighbour. All the while, bilateral trade concessions and humanitarian assistance continued, and parasitic mode of economy was concurrently being understood by Afghans as their birth right. Restraint has almost always been interpreted by tribal Afghans as appeasing – and negotiating from a place of insecurity. Unfolding the present one more time, merely saw it rhyme with the past. Persuasion-based reconciliation by Pakistan failed miserably – as it was bound to, more so in a tribal society whose strategic culture has forever respected power more than diplomacy, and which has historically seen the issues of security and power being settled by blood and iron. After some strategic recalibration by the incumbent, Pakistan finally decided to stop treating Afghans as mere brethren and follow established diplomatic and legal protocols, like all other countries of the world. The latest cross border aggression by the Taliban last  month – while Interim Afghan Foreign Minister, then in India, made a reference to disputed  territory of Kashmir as part of India – had to be responded. Immediate ceasefire request through common friends implied rattled Afghan nerves, as they realized that velvet glove is being removed from the iron fist. Three rounds of mediated Pak-Afghan talks have hitherto remained inconclusive though. That trajectory is unlikely to change, as Taliban are still unwilling to let go of their only politico-military leverage against their Eastern neighbour – tolerating and harbouring anti-Pakistan elements and encouraging them to carry out cross border militancy in Pakistan. Afghanistan continues to term terrorism as internal issue of Pakistan, conveniently setting aside its own end of the bargain of Doha agreement; while Pakistan appears willing to use its lethal and dominant kinetic force as final arbiter of any Afghan mis-adventurism. Being a landlocked country itself, and neigbours with three other landlocked countries, Afghanistan has little hope and much dependencies in trade and connectivity. It also has huge trade imbalance with all its other neighbours (approximately 8-10 times higher imports than exports, for an overall volume of approximately $4Bn) and Pakistan continues to be a free economic-run for Afghans, giving them the easiest and highest earning without any regulation. Abundant economic alternatives exist for major Afghan exports to Pakistan (vegetables, fruits and rugs) from other neighbouring countries (Iran,   Uzbekistan and Tajikistan); while the Afghans exactly know that corresponding matrix for alternate trade is unfavourably stacked against them. Had Pakistan pulled its trade lever when it had aligned itself with global war on terror, Afghanistan would have bled white in such a manner that the two centuries old Clausewitzian dictum would have emphatically